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The state of American federalism in 2017^2018 is characterized by federal policy reversals, as the
Trump administration and congressional Republicans continue to undo many of the Obama
administration’s policies. Two themes are highlighted in this essay. First, major policy changes
continue to be undertaken primarily through unilateral executive action, even with Republicans
holding the presidency and both the House and Senate. Ideological divisions within the
Republican Party prevented Congress from enacting major legislation, save for a tax reform
measure, and resulted in policy changes on health care, immigration, and the environment being
made through executive and administrative action. Another prominent feature of governance in
the early part of theTrump administration has been state resistance to federal directives, taking the
form primarily but not exclusively of state attorney general (AG) lawsuits. Democratic AGs filed
lawsuits challenging Trump administration actions on immigration and clean energy in particular.
Democratic governors and state legislators also took a variety of other actions to resist Trump
administration policies. The federal courts also continue to play an active role in shaping and
adjudicating controversies impacting federalism.
The state of American federalism in 2017–2018 is characterized by federal policy
reversals, as the Trump administration and congressional Republicans continue to
undo many of the Obama administration’s major policies ranging from the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) to the Clean Power Plan. This development reflects the
continuation of trends that emerged in the first few months of the Trump
administration, when “the arrival of a new administration with radically different
priorities” ushered in “broad policy reversals in arenas such as health care,
immigration, and the environment, with potentially important implications for
federalism and intergovernmental relations” (Goelzhauser and Rose 2017).
Two additional themes emerged in 2017–2018. First, unilateral executive action
continued to play a prominent role in policymaking at the federal level despite
unified Republican control of the federal government. With the exception of the
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Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that passed in December 2017, widening ideological
divisions within the Republican Party prevented passage of major legislation and
resulted in significant policy change occurring primarily through administrative
action. As Republican lawmakers’ efforts to repeal and replace the ACA succumbed
to legislative gridlock, the Trump administration chipped away at the law by
withholding Obamacare subsidies and announcing a variety of new rules making it
easier for insurers to sell, and consumers to buy, insurance policies that do not
comply with ACA regulations. As immigration reform stalled in Congress,
President Trump issued a series of executive orders limiting entry to the United
States from certain countries—orders that were quickly challenged in the courts.
The administration also took steps to limit environmental protections—
withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, ending the Clean Power Plan,
and suspending the Clean Water Rule—and to reduce the size of Obama-era public
lands designations.
A second emerging theme was state resistance to federal directives, primarily but
not exclusively through a surge in state attorney general (AG) lawsuits. As
discussed by Paul Nolette and Colin Provost in their article for this issue, 2017–
2018 saw the continued—and accelerated—rise of litigation brought by attorneys
general. Democratic state AGs brought scores of legal actions against the Trump
administration over issues such as immigration and clean energy, following in the
path of Republican AGs who filed lawsuits challenging Obama administration
actions in these and other areas. In several of these cases, federal judges issued
nationwide injunctions barring implementation of Trump administration actions.
In cases filed or joined by state AGs, federal judges blocked enforcement of several
of Trump’s executive orders that restricted entry to the United States from certain
countries and also blocked a Trump effort to reverse an Obama administration
policy protecting certain unauthorized immigrants from deportation. Federal
judges also sided with state AGs in ruling that the Trump administration could not
reverse or delay enforcement of certain EPA regulations and could not alter the
Obama administration’s interpretation of the scope of the ACA’s contraceptive
coverage requirement.
Democratic governors and state legislators also took a variety of actions to resist
Trump administration policies. In passing measures inconsistent with Trump
administration policies, Democratic officials embraced a course of action pursued
on a regular basis by Republican governors and state legislators during the Obama
administration, as discussed by Adam Olson, Timothy Callaghan, and Andrew
Karch in their article for this issue. California Governor Jerry Brown signed
landmark “sanctuary state” legislation, limiting the cooperation of state and local
law enforcement with federal immigration authorities—prompting a federal
lawsuit against the state. Despite the Trump administration’s rescission of
Obama’s hands-off marijuana policy vis-a-vis the states, Vermont became the
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ninth state to legalize recreational use of the drug, and the first to do so through
the legislative process.
Blue-state lawmakers also drafted and occasionally enacted legislation making
creative end-runs around other federal policies. State officials in the Northeast have
been particularly intent on pushing back against a provision of the 2017 federal tax
law that caps state and local tax deductions at $10,000, disproportionately affecting
Democratic-leaning states. Along with contemplating lawsuits challenging this
change in federal tax law, state officials have considered various other means of
passing legislation to limit the additional tax burden that the federal law imposes
on residents of their states. States have also begun to respond to the Trump
administration’s reversal of the Obama administration’s net-neutrality regulation,
by enacting state net-neutrality laws that impose various regulations on internet
service providers and thereby achieve the goals of the now rescinded Federal
Communications Commission regulation. With Democratic control of state
government at a low ebb—including only thirteen legislatures, sixteen governors,
and twenty-two attorneys general—these actions reflect the vehement resistance of
a remarkably small minority of state officials. Nonetheless, Democratic resistance
to the Trump administration’s agenda seemed to dominate the popular and
political discourse, leading Merriam-Webster Dictionary to name “federalism” as
one of the top ten words of the year in 2017.
Public Policy
The next several sections analyze federal and state policy developments in 2017 and
early 2018, focusing on the areas featuring some of the most noteworthy
federalism-related developments: health care, immigration, marijuana, education,
and the environment.
Health Care
The spring and summer of 2017 saw the repeated failure of congressional efforts to
repeal and replace the ACA, as Frank J. Thompson, Michael K. Gusmano, and
Shugo Shinohara discuss in their article for this issue. Congressional leaders had
initially hoped to push through a speedy repeal-only option following Trump’s
inauguration, but were stymied by resistance from some rank-and-file members
and administration officials who feared political fallout from eliminating popular
provisions such as the Medicaid expansion and regulations prohibiting insurance
companies from discriminating against individuals with preexisting conditions.
Throughout the spring, Congress considered a range of options including the
Better Care Reconciliation Act, the so-called Skinny Obamacare Repeal, and the
Graham-Cassidy bill, but each failed in turn. Despite controlling both chambers of
Congress and the Oval Office, the Republican Party succumbed to internal
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ideological divisions, status quo bias, and the sheer complexity of the health care
issue.
In the absence of congressional action to repeal the ACA, the Trump
administration took a series of executive actions to undermine the law’s efficacy. In
October 2017, the White House announced that it would stop making the “cost-
sharing reduction” payments to insurers that subsidize the purchase of insurance
by millions of low-income Americans. In January 2018, the administration
unveiled sweeping new rules allowing small businesses to join together to create
“association” health plans that are exempt from the consumer protections
mandated by the ACA. State officials joined with consumer groups and health
insurers to oppose the measure, arguing that the inexpensive, skimpy plans would
attract the youngest, healthiest workers—leaving older, sicker employees in
traditional health plans and contributing to rising insurance premiums. In
February 2018, the administration announced a new rule that makes it easier for
consumers to buy inexpensive insurance policies that do not comply with ACA
regulations by redefining “short-term, limited-duration insurance” as plans
covering a period of less than one year; previously, such plans were defined as
covering less than three months.
Congressional Republicans did enjoy a significant victory in their battle against
the ACA in December 2017, when Congress passed and President Trump signed
the most sweeping tax reform bill since 1986. Among other provisions, the new tax
law eliminates the penalty imposed by the ACA’s individual mandate, effective
2019. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that repealing the individual
mandate penalty will reduce federal deficits by approximately $338 billion between
2018 and 2027 and increase the number of uninsured people by 13 million in 2027
(U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2017).
Some Republican-led states also took individual actions to undermine the
ACA’s efficacy. To be sure, state officials’ actions regarding the ACA have not
always fallen along partisan lines, as Philip B. Rocco, Andrew S. Kelly, and Ann C.
Keller demonstrate in their article for this issue analyzing state participation in the
ACA’s State Innovation Models initiative. On a number of other issues concerning
ACA implementation, however, Republican state officials have been active in
undercutting the law’s effectiveness. Most notably, Idaho made headline news in
January 2018 when Republican Governor C. L. “Butch” Otter issued an executive
order instructing his state’s insurance department to allow “creative options” in
health coverage, free from “the overreaching, intrusive nature of Obamacare and its
infringement on Idahoans’ freedoms.” The insurance department subsequently
pronounced that as long as insurance companies offer at least one health plan that
complies with ACA rules, they may defy the ACA in other ways, including selling
low-cost policies that lack certain basic services, imposing yearly coverage limits,
and discriminating against people with preexisting conditions. The Trump
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administration rejected Idaho’s plan, however, explaining in a letter from CMS
administrator Seema Verma that the ACA “remains the law, and we have a duty to
enforce and uphold the law . . . although it is certainly not our preference.”
However, the letter noted that “with certain modifications,” the proposal might be
acceptable, and encouraged the Otter administration to “continue to engage in a
dialogue with [CMS] staff regarding this and other potential options” (Verma
2018).
In contrast, a number of Democrat-led states responded to federal efforts to
dismantle the ACA by replacing or shoring up the law at the state level. Following
the repeal of the federal individual mandate penalty, at least nine states considered
passing laws that would require residents to have health insurance, although
prospects for passage remained unclear at the time of writing (Armour 2018). As
the Trump administration cut back on ACA marketing and outreach, some states
invested heavily in efforts to enroll new individuals. And as the administration
paved the way for stripped-down, short-term health plans, some states looked into
tightening regulations on such plans. Whereas the ACA originally sought to reduce
health disparities among states, such actions in certain states—and their absence in
others—looked likely to further widen the health care gap (Sanger-Katz 2018).
In 2017–2018, Republican states continued to seek conservative new twists on
the optional expansion of Medicaid under the ACA through the use of waivers.
The scope for such efforts expanded in January 2018, when the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a letter to state Medicaid directors
providing new guidance for waiver proposals under Section 1115 of the Social
Security Act that would impose work requirements (referred to as “community
engagement”) as a condition of Medicaid eligibility—an option that had previously
been firmly rejected by the Obama administration. Conservatives hailed the
development as pro-work and anti-poverty, while liberals saw it as a thinly-veiled
attempt to reduce coverage of vulnerable groups.
In early 2018, the Trump administration approved three states’ waiver
applications including work requirements. First, CMS approved a waiver
application from the Republican Governor of Kentucky, Matt Bevin, titled
“Kentucky Helping to Engage and Achieve Long Term Health” or KY HEALTH, in
January 2018. In addition to a work requirement, the waiver included several other
conservative provisions including premiums of up to four percent of income—
greater than the level approved in any other waiver to date—as well as coverage
“lock-out periods” for a variety of reasons including nonpayment of premiums.
Shortly thereafter, CMS approved a similar waiver application from Indiana, which
had unsuccessfully sought approval of work requirements from the Obama
administration in 2015. In March, CMS approved Arkansas’s work requirement
application, but deferred the state’s request to reduce eligibility by lowering the
income threshold from 138 percent to 100 percent of the poverty level. All three
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states planned to exempt Medicaid beneficiaries from the work requirement if they
fall into certain categories such as disabled, pregnant, or primary caregiver,
although the states’ definitions of who meets these criteria varied.
Promptly after CMS approved KY HEALTH, Governor Bevin issued an
executive order calling for the end of Kentucky’s Medicaid expansion if the waiver
were to be struck down in court. Undeterred, fifteen Kentucky Medicaid
beneficiaries filed suit against the Trump administration in the case of Stewart v.
Hargan (now Stewart v. Azar). The suit charged that Kentucky’s recently approved
waiver violates the Secretary of HHS’s authority under the Social Security Act,
because it is not an experimental project consistent with the objectives of the
Medicaid Act. As Sara Rosenbaum observed, the recently approved waivers
represent a dramatic departure from those approved by previous administrations,
which had balanced risks, such as those arising from spending curbs, against gains,
such as enrollment expansions. Moreover, this strategy for “selectively culling the
Medicaid population” was particularly striking as it was “set to unfold against
perhaps the nation’s most successful ACA Medicaid expansion”—championed by
Governor Bevin’s predecessor, Democrat Steve Beshear—under which upwards of
400,000 people gained coverage (Rosenbaum 2018).
Several other states have expressed an interest in Medicaid work requirements.
As of March 2018, seven Republican-led states—Arizona, Kansas, Maine,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, Utah, and Wisconsin—had pending waiver
applications featuring work requirements as a condition of eligibility (Musumeci
et al. 2018). Utah’s application in particular received attention because, like
Arkansas’s deferred request, it also sought to reduce eligibility from 138 percent to
100 percent of the federal poverty level while continuing to receive the same federal
contribution rate. A few other states, including Oklahoma and Florida, mulled the
possibility of following suit with work-requirement waiver applications of their
own. Meanwhile, an investigation by the Government Accountability Office found
that there has been insufficient federal and state oversight of Medicaid waivers, and
that waiver evaluations have “generally lacked rigor” and suffered from “significant
methodological weaknesses,” calling into question the growing use of waivers to
dramatically remake the Medicaid program (U.S. GAO 2018).
The ongoing opioid crisis in the United States prompted governors to join with
medical providers and health-care advocates in pushing Congress to repeal a long-
standing rule that limits states’ ability to use Medicaid to fund care for opioid
addiction. The so-called “Institutions for Mental Diseases (IMD) Exclusion”
restricts Medicaid payments to facilities with more than sixteen beds from
providing substance abuse treatment, reflecting the federal government’s efforts,
around the time of Medicaid’s enactment, to deinstitutionalize mental-health
patients and integrate them into communities. The push to repeal the rule
represents a rare instance of bipartisan consensus among governors. In the absence
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of congressional action, the Trump administration granted waivers allowing two
states (Kentucky and West Virginia) to get around the IMD exclusion, and
signaled its openness to considering additional applications.
Immigration
Immigration federalism remains at center stage in the policy arena, as described
more fully by Gary M. Reich in his article in this issue. Many of the most
pressing issues are embroiled in ongoing litigation. Federal courts enjoined the
first two iterations of President Trump’s executive orders in early 2017 limiting
entry from certain countries. The Supreme Court in June 2017 agreed to review
the validity of the second executive order, but this order expired and the case was
dismissed from the docket. Upon the second executive order’s expiration,
President Trump in September 2017 issued Proclamation 9645 (2017) limiting
entry from nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and
Yemen (though Chad was removed in April 2018). After the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit largely upheld but narrowed a district court’s
injunction against this third version of the travel ban, the Supreme Court again
granted review and the case is set for oral argument in April 2018. The Court
granted certiorari to address several questions, including whether the claims are
justiciable, whether the proclamation falls within the president’s statutory and
constitutional authority, and whether it violates the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause.
Policies concerning so-called “sanctuary” jurisdictions continue to raise
important federalism issues. As municipal governments continue to adopt policies
that limit cooperation with federal law enforcement officials with respect to
immigration, several states have moved to limit local government authority in this
area. Most prominently, Texas enacted legislation in 2017 preventing local entities
from passing policies that “prohibit[] or materially limit[] the enforcement of
immigration laws” (Texas Senate Bill 4 [2017]). Moreover, the bill commands local
law enforcement to “comply with, honor, and fulfill” ICE detainer requests (Texas
Senate Bill 4 [2017]). The City of El Cenizo initiated litigation alleging, among
other claims, that federal law preempts the bill; that it violates the U.S.
Constitution’s First and Fourteenth Amendments; and that it violates separation of
powers and home rule provisions of the Texas Constitution. After a federal district
court initially enjoined enforcement of parts of the law (City of Cenizo v. Texas,
No. SA-17-CV-404-OLG [2017]), the Fifth Circuit stayed part of the injunction
(City of Cenizo v. Texas, No. 17-50762 [2017]) and litigation to resolve the case on
its merits is in progress. Moving in the other direction, several cities in California
are poised to sue the state in an effort to secure exemptions from its sanctuary
policies (Holder 2018), which are discussed in more detail below.
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Litigation is also ongoing regarding Executive Order 13768 (2017), where
President Trump stated intent to deny federal funds to jurisdictions that do not
comply with federal immigration law. In the most thorough decision on the merits
to date, a federal district court in California enjoined enforcement of the order,
finding that plaintiff municipalities are likely to prevail in arguing that the order is
unconstitutional (County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 [2017]).
Specifically, the court indicated that municipalities were likely to succeed in
arguing that the order violated the separation of powers; usurps congressional
spending authority; violates the Spending Clause, even if the president had that
authority; violates the Tenth Amendment’s prohibition on commandeering local
officials; and violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as a result of
various ambiguities, including a lack of clarity on what constitutes a “sanctuary”
jurisdiction and what actions would constitute violations of the order. Aside from
the merits, this litigation poses potentially interesting justiciability questions given
that the order has not yet been enforced. In County of Santa Clara v. Trump, the
district court argued that it was sufficient that municipal policies were inconsistent
with the order, that there was expressed intent to enforce the order, and that
budgetary uncertainty constituted sufficient injury.
Meanwhile Congress continues to consider legislation aimed at thwarting
sanctuary jurisdictions. In 2017, the House passed the “No Sanctuary for Criminals
Act” (H.R. 3003). It declares that no governmental entity or individual may
“prohibit or in any way restrict” efforts to comply with federal immigration law.
While Senate passage is less likely in its current partisan configuration, President
Trump continues to lobby for action. In his weekly address on March 10, 2018, he
said, “Sanctuary jurisdictions are the best friend of smugglers, gang members, drug
dealers, human traffickers, killers, and other violent offenders. We want our cities
to be sanctuaries for Americans, not safe havens for criminals. That is why I am
calling on Congress to block funds for jurisdictions that shield dangerous
criminals.”
On March 6, 2018, the Trump administration brought suit against California
arguing that federal immigration law preempts recently enacted California
legislation limiting the ability of employers to provide nonpublic access to the
workplace without a warrant for immigration enforcement purposes, directing the
state AG to inspect facilities holding immigration detainees, and limiting state and
local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. In its initial complaint,
the administration argued that these statutes “reflect a deliberate effort by
California to obstruct the United States’ enforcement of federal immigration law,
to regulate private entities that seek to cooperate with federal authorities consistent
with their obligations under federal law, and to impede consultation and
communication between federal and state law enforcement officials” (Complaint
2018, 2). Consistent with how changing partisan perspectives have driven recent
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federalism debates more broadly (Goelzhauser and Rose 2017), the tenor of this
litigation resembles questions resolved by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), where the Obama administration successfully argued
that antiimmigration laws in Arizona were preempted by federal immigration law.
Judicial proceedings also continue in the dispute over the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy. Announced by President Obama in 2012,
DACA allowed certain individuals who entered the country as minors and
remained undocumented to receive renewable two-year permits and avoid
deportation. After President Obama in 2014 sought to expand the program, by
putting in place a Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents (DAPA) program, numerous states challenged the validity
of the DAPA order. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed an injunction against
DAPA by an equally divided vote after Justice Scalia’s passing (United States v.
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 [2017]). When President Trump moved to end DACA,
numerous states, municipalities, and other entities brought suit raising various
claims, including that the rescission violated the Administrative Procedure Act,
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause. Finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits of the claim that rescission was arbitrary and capricious and thus invalid
under the Administrative Procedure Act, a federal district court mandated that
the program be continued (Regents of the University of California v. United States
Department of Homeland Security, 3: 17-cv-05211 [2018]). Subsequently, the
Supreme Court denied the government’s request for expedited review and further
litigation is pending. Simultaneously, Congress continues to discuss legislative
reform.
Marijuana
Marijuana policy was characterized by growing federal-state conflict in 2017–2018.
In January 2018, U.S. AG Jeff Sessions rescinded a triad of Obama administration
memos that had established a hands-off policy with regard to state laws legalizing
marijuana. The Obama administration memos, issued by Deputy Attorneys
General David Ogden and James Cole, had stated that although marijuana
remained illegal at the federal level, federal prosecutors should place low priority
on prosecuting growers, sellers, and consumers as long as they complied with state
laws. Calling the change in policy a “return to the rule of law,” Sessions instructed
“federal prosecutors deciding which cases to prosecute to weigh all relevant
considerations of the crime, the deterrent effect of criminal prosecution, and the
cumulative impact of particular crimes on the community” (Sessions 2018).
However, Sessions later clarified that federal law enforcement lacks the resources to
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prosecute “small” or “routine” cases, and would instead continue to focus on drug
gangs and other major cases (Gurman 2018).
Political leaders in states where marijuana is legal denounced the change in
federal guidance. California Lieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom complained that
the Trump administration had “destructively doubled down on the failed, costly
and racially discriminatory policy of marijuana criminalization, trampling on the
will of California voters” (Newsom 2018). Oregon Governor Kate Brown called the
reversal “deeply concerning and disruptive to our state’s economy,” and protested
that “voters in Oregon were clear when they chose for Oregon to legalize the sale
of marijuana and the federal government should not stand in the way of the will of
Oregonians” (Brown 2018). Many state leaders complained that they had not been
consulted or notified in advance about the change.
Sessions also sent a letter to congressional leaders in 2017, asking them to repeal
the Rohrabacher-Blumenauer (formerly Rohrabacher-Farr) Amendment, which
since 2014 has blocked the Justice Department from using federal tax dollars to
prosecute states where medical marijuana is legal. However, after two brief
government shutdowns and considerable budgetary uncertainty, Congress finally
hammered out a budget deal that preserves the amendment, at least for the time
being.
In stark contrast to the Trump administration’s efforts to crack down on
marijuana, public opinion polls indicated record high support for legalization of
the drug. According to an October 2017 poll by Gallup, 64 percent of Americans
say the drug should be legal—the highest level of support in the nearly five decades
Gallup has been polling on the topic. Although a partisan divide remains, with 72
percent of Democrats favoring legalization compared to 51 percent of Republicans,
2017 was the first time a majority of Republicans have expressed support for
legalization. The 51 percent approval rate reflects a sizeable nine percentage-point
increase relative to the previous year. As the Gallup report observed, “Attorney
General Jeff Sessions could find himself out of step with his own party if the
current trends continue” (Gallup 2017).
State and local efforts to legalize marijuana progressed in 2017–2018. Most
notably, Vermont became the ninth state to legalize recreational use of the drug—
and the first to do so through the legislative process.1 After the state’s Democrat-
controlled legislature passed the bill, Republican Governor Phil Scott signed it into
law with “mixed emotions,” observing: “A number of states have already legalized
it surrounding us. Whether we like it or not, it’s here and it’s being utilized, so we
have to take steps to promote the general public” (Sanders 2018). Reflecting a
bipartisan compromise, the Vermont law does not go as far as those of other states
that have legalized marijuana. It allows individuals aged twenty-one years and over
to possess one ounce and to grow up to two plants at home, but does not permit a
legal retail market for the drug.
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Vermont’s law set an important new precedent that the Democratic leaders of
several other states signaled they wished to emulate. New Jersey’s new governor,
Democrat Phil Murphy, campaigned on the issue and, upon taking office,
expressed his desire to sign legislation legalizing marijuana during his first year. As
of spring 2018, a bill to legalize the possession and use of small amounts of the
drug and establish a legal retail market was under consideration in the state
legislature, but prospects for passage were murky due to ambivalence or opposition
among lawmakers of both parties. Rhode Island’s Democrat-controlled general
assembly set up a commission to study legalization, and Delaware’s Democrat-
controlled general assembly established a task force to do the same. Meanwhile,
advocates in a handful of other states including Michigan and Ohio pushed to get
recreational marijuana on the 2018 ballot.
Legalization of recreational marijuana in California, passed by ballot measure in
2016, went into full effect on January 1, 2018, when recreational sales became legal
for the first time. Although the law allows adults twenty-one and older to possess
up to one ounce of the drug and to grow up to six plants at home, the state’s anti-
tobacco laws prohibit residents from smoking the drug in public. Despite
marijuana’s new legal status within the state, some local governments moved to
regulate or ban its sale and use. Four of the state’s largest cities—Los Angeles, San
Diego, San Jose, and San Francisco—allow recreational cannabis shops, but many
other localities including Bakersfield and much of Orange County ban all
marijuana businesses. The result is “a rapidly evolving patchwork of rules that can
vary widely from one city to the next” (Staggs 2018).
Implementation of 2016 ballot measures legalizing recreational marijuana in two
other states—Massachusetts and Maine—was slower, following months of
deliberations over rules and regulations governing sale of the drug.
Massachusetts’s Cannabis Control Commission finalized its rules in March 2018,
paving the way for retail sales to begin in July. In Maine, Republican Governor
Paul LePage vetoed the legislature’s first bill to regulate marijuana sales in 2017,
arguing that it conflicted with federal law, was inconsistent with the state’s medical
marijuana program, and created “a bifurcated regulatory structure with two
Executive Branch departments regulating the market, which is almost certain to
create unnecessary additional administrative costs and confusion,” among other
concerns (LePage 2017). In 2018, state lawmakers set to work drafting a revised
bill, but its prospects for passage and avoiding another gubernatorial veto
remained unclear.
Lawmakers in several states including California, Alaska, and Massachusetts
responded to the Trump administration’s reversal of Obama-era protections for
states that have legalized marijuana by considering bills that would provide
“sanctuary status” for licensed cannabis businesses. Borrowing an idea from the
recent state and local movement to protect undocumented immigrants, the
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measures would prohibit the use of state or local resources to assist in federal drug
enforcement efforts, in the absence of a court order, targeting businesses or
individuals who are in compliance with state marijuana laws. Berkeley, California,
passed a resolution making it a marijuana sanctuary city in February 2018.
Efforts to legalize medical marijuana and decriminalize possession of small
amounts of the drug also inched forward. West Virginia became the twenty-ninth
state to legalize the use of marijuana for certain medical conditions in 2017; the
law only applies to cannabis-infused products, excluding smokable marijuana.
Several other states including Kentucky, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and
Missouri mulled legalization of medical marijuana in 2018, either through
legislation or ballot initiatives (Sanders 2018). Although decriminalization of
marijuana stalled in Alabama, several cities including Atlanta, Albuquerque, and
Kansas City decriminalized the possession of small amounts of the drug. And San
Francisco moved to automatically dismiss all marijuana misdemeanor convictions
dating back to 1975 and clear the records of individuals who faced such charges.
Education
The Trump administration’s efforts to scale back the role of the federal
government in education policy continued in 2017–2018. One area in which this
shift was particularly apparent was school accountability. The Every Student
Succeeds Act (ESSA), signed by President Barack Obama in 2015, replaced No
Child Left Behind and diminished the federal role in improving or closing low-
performing schools by allowing states to establish their own accountability systems.
In early 2017, congressional Republicans further reduced the federal role by
rescinding Obama-era regulations clarifying how states should measure schools’
performance and hold low-performing schools accountable under the law. U.S.
Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos subsequently released a scaled-back application
template for states to use in developing their accountability plans that included
fewer requirements than before, particularly with regard to soliciting input from
the education community. She said the new guidelines would allow states and
districts to implement the law with “maximum flexibility,” but a variety of
stakeholders including the National Governors Association, American Federation
of Teachers, and National PTA expressed disapproval (Klein 2017).
The process by which the Department of Education vetted state accountability
systems in late 2017 and early 2018 was turbulent. In approving thirty-five states’
plans while sending others’ back for revisions, DeVos vexed both congressional
Democrats, who accused the Education Department of rubber-stamping
inadequate plans, and Republicans eager for maximum state flexibility.
Education and civil rights groups joined Democrats in criticizing the approval of
state plans that inadequately measured the performance of certain groups such as
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minority students and inadequately enforced improvement for those groups
(Camera 2018). DeVos responded by pointing her finger back at the states for
failing to take full advantage of the new freedom they had been afforded by
innovating in educational programming. Complaining about “too many plans that
only meet the bare minimum required by the law,” DeVos nonetheless vowed not
to fall into the “trap of a top-down approach” that had been pursued by her
predecessors (DeVos 2018).
Another area characterized by federal policy reversals and federal-state conflict
was Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, a federal civil rights law that
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any educational program that
receives federal funding. In February 2017, the Trump administration revoked an
Obama-era guidance letter specifying that public schools should allow students to
use bathrooms that align with their gender identity. In rescinding the guidance,
DeVos and Sessions said that Title IX did not compel schools to allow transgender
students to use the bathroom of their choice, and argued that states and school
districts should be permitted to determine how to best accommodate the needs of
transgender students. Civil rights groups criticized the move as leaving transgender
students susceptible to aggression and violence. One year later, the Education
Department confirmed that it had dismissed several civil rights complaints from
transgender students who had been prohibited from using school bathrooms
matching their gender identity, and clarified that it did not plan to hear or take
action on such complaints.
The Education Department rescinded another Obama-era Title IX guidance
letter when it offered new guidelines on how schools should respond to allegations
of sexual assault. In September 2017, the Trump administration replaced Obama’s
2011 “Dear Colleague” letter with a “Q&A on Campus Sexual Misconduct” stating
that to protect due process for the accused, schools could use a more rigorous
standard of proof known as “clear and convincing evidence” instead of the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard that had been advanced by the Obama
administration (U.S. Department of Education 2017). The new guidance also
allowed schools to pursue informal resolutions such as mediation if both parties
agree to it, and to establish an appeals process. The move drew both praise and
criticism from various groups, but many campuses indicated that it would have
little effect on their sexual assault policies.
Following the February 2018 mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
School in Parkland, Florida, public pressure mounted for new federal and state
policies to promote school safety. In March, the Florida Legislature passed
sweeping bipartisan legislation that, among other measures, funded additional
school security and mental health personnel and permitted certain staff members
to carry guns in schools. Subsequently, several other states mulled similar
measures. Florida is not the first state to allow teachers to carry guns, although
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many educational groups including the National Education Association and
American Federation of Teachers are opposed to the policy (Hobbs and Brody
2018). For its part, the White House announced a few token measures—including
the creation of a school safety commission led by DeVos and a pledge to fund
firearm training to school personnel through the Department of Justice—but
otherwise left policy changes up to states and school districts, calling school safety
“a state and local issue” (Camera 2018).
Environment
The Trump administration continues to take steps to limit environmental
protections. As David M. Konisky and Neal D. Woods explain more fully in this
issue, the federalism implications have been striking. In June 2017, the
administration announced that it would withdraw from the Paris Climate
Agreement. The agreement is a global pact to reduce emissions and manage the
global average temperature to counteract climate change. Examples of important
regulatory maneuvers include the October 2017 announcement that the
administration would end the Clean Power Plan and January 2018 suspension of
the Clean Water Rule. The former is an Obama-era regulation that seeks to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions, while the latter subjects certain waterways to regulation
under the Clean Water Act.
One emerging federalism dispute involves the Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards. By regulating vehicle fuel efficiency standards, the CAFE
standards are widely considered to be an important tool for mitigating emissions
and greenhouse gases. Three recent events surrounding the CAFE standards are
notable. First, in a lawsuit brought by five states among other entities, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the administration’s decision to
delay implementation of an Obama-era rule to increase noncompliance penalties,
which had eroded over time through inflation (National Resources Defense Counsel
v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 17-2780 [2018]). Second, in a
move “sure to spark major political and legal battles,” the administration
announced that it would revoke Obama-era standards mandating certain vehicles
to average more than fifty miles per gallon by 2025 (Eilperin and Denis 2018).
Third, as discussed in detail in last year’s Annual Review (Goelzhauser and Rose
2017, 299–300), California’s preemption waiver to adopt more stringent emission
standards—which in turn have been adopted by numerous states—were thought to
be one of the administration’s key targets for regulatory rollback. While
announcing a plan to revise CAFE standards, Administrator Pruitt declared, “EPA
will set a national standard for greenhouse gas emissions that allows auto
manufacturers to make cars that people both want and can afford—while still
expanding environmental and safety benefits of newer cars” (Kulish 2018).
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Referring to California’s waiver specifically, Pruitt added, “Cooperative federalism
doesn’t mean that one state can dictate standards for the rest of the country”
(Kulisch 2018).
States and municipalities are combatting efforts to limit environmental
protection in several additional ways. During the Trump administration’s first year,
Democratic state attorneys general brought dozens of legal actions over issues such
as clean energy, pollution, and federal lands (Grandoni 2018). In February 2018,
for example, New York led a coalition of eleven states challenging the Clean Water
Rule’s suspension as a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. In the
complaint, plaintiff states argued that the suspension “harms the States’ waters by
limiting the [Clean Water] Act’s protections and by making implementation of the
Act more difficult,” while also impos[ing] economic burdens and costs upon the
States and harm[ing] their proprietary interests” (Complaint 2018, 4). Litigation
over the Clean Power Plan also remains active.
Aside from litigation, states and municipalities are taking a variety of steps
toward enhancing environmental protection. After the Trump administration
announced withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, numerous governmental
entities pledged support for the agreement (Jordans and Thiesing 2017). At the
state level, California continues to lead the way toward enhanced environmental
protection, aggressively pursuing emissions cuts while outlining new strategies in
areas such as renewable power and transportation (e.g., Plumer 2017). Legislative
leaders in Oregon are hoping to pass a cap on greenhouse gas emissions in 2019
(Selsky and James 2018). And while the effort failed, Washington’s Governor Jay
Inslee pursued “the nation’s first tax on planet-warming carbon dioxide pollution”
in what may have been a play for visibility as a Democratic candidate for president
in 2020 (Davenport 2018). At the municipal level, New York City sued oil
companies such as BP, Chevron, and ExxonMobil to recover for alleged past and
future injuries resulting from company actions that may have contributed to
climate change (Mooney and Grandoni 2018).
The administration’s efforts to drill for oil and gas have also generated
federalism controversies. In January 2018, the Trump administration announced a
proposal to permit drilling for oil and gas in various waters comprising the outer
continental shelf. The proposal was met with immediate disapproval from various
state leaders, and Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke emphasized that “states, local
communities and congressional delegations will all have a say” (Fears 2018). A few
days later, Secretary Zinke met with Florida’s Republican Governor Rick Scott,
who earlier announced opposition to the proposal, and declared the state “unique”
and “off the table” with respect to coastal drilling (Bousquet 2018). This exemption
led politicians from other states to seek exemptions, and several Democrats alleged
that the disparate treatment was a result of partisan divergence rather than
Florida’s unique circumstances (Daley 2018). The administration subsequently
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walked back the promise of an exemption for Florida, but the debate continues
and numerous states are exploring legal efforts to frustrate the proposal’s
implementation (Muoio and French 2018).
As John Freemuth details in this issue, public lands have also been a hotbed for
debate concerning federalism and the environment. Upon taking office, President
Trump ordered review of twenty-seven national monuments designated since 1996
under the Antiquities Act (Eilperin 2017). Several public lands designations by
President Obama proved particularly controversial. In December 2017, President
Trump dramatically reduced the size of two Obama-era designations in Utah—
Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante—citing the importance of local control
(Gonzales, Siegler, and Dwyer 2017). Subsequently, evidence from a public records
request litigated by The New York Times revealed that a desire to open certain
public lands to oil and gas drilling motivated the decisions (Lipton and Friedman
2018). While litigation over the scope of presidential power to shrink designations
under the Antiquities Act continues, the administration continues to review public
lands boundaries for reshaping.
The Supreme Court
The judiciary remains an active arena for federalism. In its 2016 Term, which
spanned October 2016 through June 2017, the Supreme Court did not issue any
decisions fundamentally altering core areas of federalism jurisprudence such as
commerce or the Tenth Amendment. Nonetheless, numerous decisions have
important federalism implications. With the Court returning to full strength in
April 2017 after Justice Neil Gorsuch’s confirmation, it is poised to address a
number of critical questions concerning federalism during its 2017 Term. While
this section focuses on the Supreme Court, the reservoir of percolating issues is
well stocked. As Nolette and Provost demonstrate in their article for this issue,
state attorneys general remain active participants in the judicial arena, challenging
various executive branch actions. Immigration and environmental policymaking
are areas where important litigation is likely to reach the Court in the near future
as we discussed previously. The rest of this part of the article discusses decisions
implicating federalism from the Court’s most recently completed term as well as
important pending cases in its current term.
The 2016 Term
One consequential case joined the issues of federalism, race discrimination, and
housing policy. In Bank of America v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017), the
Court allowed the city of Miami to bring suit against two banks for alleged
violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Miami argued that Bank of America and
Wells Fargo issued riskier mortgages to black and Latino customers in violation of
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the FHA, resulting in harm to the city as a result of factors such as decreased tax
revenue and increased spending on municipal services as a result of foreclosures.
While it is common for states and municipalities to sue on behalf of their citizens
as parens patriae, Miami alleged that it was an “aggrieved person” under the FHA.
The Court held five-three that the city’s alleged injuries were within the “zone of
interests” the statute was designed to protect. Although the Court remanded the
case for reconsideration of whether the banks’ alleged discriminatory lending
practices actually caused the city’s financial injuries, allowing municipalities to seek
recovery under the FHA has important federalism implications.
The Court decided two important redistricting cases. These cases demonstrated
the Court’s willingness to grapple with redistricting and help set the stage for what
promises to be an active 2018 on this front as discussed in more detail below. In
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017), the Court held by a five-three vote that
two of North Carolina’s congressional districts were drawn to pack-in black voters
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. North
Carolina argued that one of the district’s boundaries nonetheless satisfied strict
scrutiny because it was drawn to satisfy the Voting Rights Act (VRA)—an
argument the Court rejected. Writing in dissent, Justice Alito suggested that “if a
court mistakes a political gerrymander for a racial gerrymander, it illegitimately
invades a traditional domain of state authority, usurping the role of a state’s
elected representatives” (1490). Importantly, Justice Thomas provided a fifth vote
for the majority.
In Bethune-Hill v. State Bd. Of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017), the Court
considered whether twelve Virginia legislative districts explicitly drawn to create a
black voting-age population of at least 55 percent violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The three-judge district court upheld the
constitutionality of each district. With respect to one of those districts, the Court
held that the state’s effort to comply with the VRA was sufficient for satisfying
strict scrutiny. With respect to the other eleven districts, however, the Court held
that the three-judge district court panel applied the wrong test and remanded for
reconsideration. Specifically, the Court clarified two points of law. First, it noted
that a plaintiff need not show actual conflict between a redistricting plan and
traditional redistricting principles; rather, racial predominance can be shown
through evidence with respect to legislative purpose or more circumstantial
evidence concerning district lines or demographics. Second, the Court held that
analyses regarding racial predominance in line drawing should be holistic rather
than limiting the consideration of racial motive to the extent that plaintiffs identify
deviations from traditional redistricting criteria specifically attributable to race.
The Court decided several preemption cases, but none make a major
contribution preemption jurisprudence. In Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400
(2017), the Court held that the Uniform Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act
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preempts a state court’s order treating a portion of retirement pay waived to
receive disability benefits as community property for division in divorce. In
Kindred Nursing Centers v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017), the Court held that the
Federal Arbitration Act preempted a state court decision refusing to recognize the
validity of arbitration agreements executed by individuals who held power of
attorney, when federal law otherwise requires such agreements to be treated the
same as other contracts. And in Coventry Health Care of Missouri v. Nevils, 137 S.
Ct. 1190 (2017), the Court held that the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act
preempts state law prohibiting private carriers providing insurance to public
employees under the Act from seeking reimbursement (i.e., recovering payment
received from another entity) and subrogation (i.e., transfer of a right to a third-
party payment to the insurer who can then pursue recovery) after an insured wins
judgment from a third party. All judgments were unanimous except Kindred
Nursing, where Justice Thomas adhered to his view that the Federal Arbitration Act
does not apply in state court proceedings.
With respect to decisions affecting state actions and policymaking, the Court
decided several cases with First Amendment implications. In Packingham v. North
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), the Court unanimously invalidated a state law
making it a felony for registered sex offenders to access a social networking site
known to permit use by minors. Although the Court recognized the state’s
significant interest in protecting minors from sexual exploitation, it found that
North Carolina’s regulatory approach was too broad. In Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017), the Court considered the validity of a New
York law prohibiting sellers from imposing a surcharge on credit card transactions
while allowing the economic equivalent of offering a cash discount. Whereas the
lower court held that the law permissibly regulated conduct as opposed to speech,
the Court unanimously held that the law regulated speech by dictating how
businesses communicate with respect to the discount/fee. However, the Court
sidestepped the underlying constitutional question, remanding the case for
reconsideration in light of the speech versus conduct distinction. This “quarter-loaf
outcome” (1153), as Justice Sonia Sotomayor put it in a concurrence in the
judgment joined by infrequent ally Justice Samuel Alito, may have reflected
division on the underlying merits question absent a ninth justice. Turning to the
religion clauses, in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012
(2017), the Court invalidated a state agency’s decision to categorically deny
churches access to grant money to purchase recycled tire material for playgrounds.
Although the agency argued that its refusal was dictated by a state constitutional
provision prohibiting any money from being “taken from the public treasury” and
given “directly or indirectly in aid of any church” (2017, quoting the Missouri
Constitution), the Court held seven-two that denial of access to monies otherwise
available on a general basis violates the Free Exercise Clause.
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The Court also addressed an important question at the intersection of property
rights and environmental protection—with widespread implications for states and
municipalities. At issue in Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017), was how to
define the relevant unit of property when assessing a regulatory takings claim. As
opposed to state seizure of property in a traditional takings dispute, a regulatory
takings dispute arises when a landowner attributes government action to a loss in
property value or economic use. The plaintiffs in Murr owned two adjacent lots
abutting a river, and wanted to sell a single 1.25 acre lot. A regulation dictated that
at least 1.0 acre be suitable for development to sell one of two commonly owned
adjacent lots, but after unsuitable areas were subtracted pursuant to regulations
designed to protect the river area plaintiffs were left with a 0.5 acre lot for
development purposes. After being denied a variance by the county board,
plaintiffs sought recovery for a regulatory taking. Finding that plaintiffs retained
options for land use in the adjacent lots, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that
the regulations did not deprive plaintiffs of all or substantially all economic value
in the property. Plaintiffs, however, argued that the court improperly calculated
value by combining both parcels rather than focusing on the parcel they were not
allowed to sell.
States were active as amici in Murr. Eight states argued that aggregating the
adjacent lots for valuation purposes was improper, preferring to base the decision
on the fact that state law joined the parcels for development purposes. They
contended that their interests as amici were “at its apex” due to the potential
impairment of property rights for “citizens vis-a-vis the States” and “States as
against the federal government” (Brief for Nevada et al. as Amici Curiae 2016, 1).
Nine states, meanwhile, argued for aggregation, contending that their interests lie
in balancing property rights with a desire to “protect the environment” and
“ensure that development occurs in a balanced manner, benefiting both property
owners and the larger community” (Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae
2016, 1). State and municipal interests such as the Council of State Governments,
National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, and U.S. Conference
of Mayors also filed a joint amicus brief for the respondent. In a five-three
decision, the Court ruled for the respondent and proposed a multifactor test to
guide future decisions that includes considering how property is treated under state
law, the property’s physical characteristics, and the land’s prospective value.
Writing in dissent, Chief Justice John Roberts lamented that the new test
“compromises the Takings Clause as a barrier between individuals and the press of
the public interest” (1956).
Several of the Court’s decisions have implications for how states implement the
death penalty. The Court granted certiorari in McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790
(2017), to determine whether a prior precedent clearly dictated that states must
afford indigent defendants meaningful expert assistance independent of the
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prosecution. In what a four-justice dissent called “a most unseemly maneuver”
(1802), the five-justice majority sidestepped this question but found that Alabama’s
provision of mental health assistance during the underlying capital proceedings
“fell . . . dramatically short” of the constitutional minimum (1801). In Moore v.
Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017), the Court vacated a Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals decision to disregard contemporary guidelines for determining whether a
capital defendant is intellectually disabled in favor of guidelines adopted by the
Texas court in 1992. And In Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017), the Court
granted habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel after a psychologist
testifying for the defendant, who is black, claimed that the defendant’s race was
“know[n] to predict future dangerousness” (769), thus aiding the prosecution in
demonstrating a necessary element for a death sentence, which the jury
subsequently imposed.
The Court also continues to actively use its “shadow docket,” which refers to
“a range of orders and summary decisions that defy its normal procedural
regularity” (Baude 2015, 1), to dispose of important issues, and several of last
term’s summary decisions impact states. In Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1
(2016), the Court unanimously vacated a decision by the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals stating that the Court had “implicitly overruled” (2) a prior
precedent holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the use of victim
impact evidence unrelated to the crime at a capital sentencing hearing. The Court
also unanimously vacated a decision by the Nevada Supreme Court in Rippo v.
Baker, 137 S. Ct. 905 (2017), which it deemed had applied the wrong legal
standard in declaring that a request for judicial recusal due to bias could not go
forward absent evidence of actual bias, whereas the Court had previously
indicated that such a claim could go forward under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause when “the probability of actual bias . . . is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable” (907). And in Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017),
the Court summarily reversed an Arkansas Supreme Court ruling that a state
requirement to list the name of a mother’s male spouse on a birth certificate need
not be applied to same-sex couples. In a six-three per curiam decision, the Court
held that this was included in the “constellation of benefits” (2078) the state
linked to marriage and was thus encompassed by the Court’s ruling in Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined by Justices
Alito and Clarence Thomas, arguing that “the strong medicine of summary
reversal” (2080) is not warranted where the outcome is not clearly dictated by
Obergefell. Although the dissenters did not reach a conclusion on the merits,
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion offers an early signal of his position on questions
concerning Obergefell’s application. On the other side, that Chief Justice Roberts
joined the majority disposition is notable.
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Percolating Issues
With a full Court for a complete term for the first time since Justice Antonin
Scalia’s passing, the 2017 Term promises to be a blockbuster compared to recent
years. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 16-476 (2016), is perhaps
the most important case with respect to core federalism doctrine. It considers
whether a federal law prohibiting states from authorizing sports betting
unconstitutionally commandeers New Jersey—in violation of the Tenth
Amendment and broader constitutional structure—in the wake of the state
partially repealing its sports betting law. Perhaps the most salient case more
generally, which also has important federalism implications, is Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 16-111 (2016). After being held on
the Court’s docket for nearly a year, this case considers whether a state’s
antidiscrimination law can be used to require a custom cake maker to provide
service to a same-sex couple under the First Amendment’s Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses. In addition to the case’s First Amendment implications, it
promises to further the Court’s development of jurisprudence on issues concerning
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
The Court’s 2017 Term includes several other First Amendment cases with
policy implications for the states. In Janus v. American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees, No. 16-1466 (2017), the Court revisits the issue of
whether mandatory union fees violate the Speech Clause, a question on which it
deadlocked in 2016 after Justice Scalia’s passing. Thus, Justice Gorsuch’s vote will
presumably be decisive. In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, No. 16-1435
(2017), the Court considers whether a Minnesota law prohibiting political badges,
buttons, and insignia from being worn around a polling place on election day
violates the Speech Clause. In National Institute of Family Life v. Becerra, 16-1140
(2017), the Court will address whether a California law requiring antichoice, state
regulated clinics to provide information on issues such as state-funded abortion
services violates the Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. The Court considers whether
a plaintiff alleging retaliatory arrest under Section 1983 must plead and prove the
absence of probable cause in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 17-21 (2017), a
question that arises out of a long-running dispute between a resident and city
council. In Benisek v. Lamone, 17-333 (2017), the Court considers a First
Amendment retaliation claim in the context of a Maryland redistricting dispute.
Several other redistricting and voting cases are on the Court’s current docket. With
respect to voting, Husted v. A Philip Randolph Institute, 16-980 (2017), examines
whether Ohio’s decision to trigger removal from its voter file after two years of
inactivity is consistent with federal law. The most prominent redistricting cases are Gill
v. Whitford, 16-1161 (2017), which raises a variety of questions concerning a state
legislative redistricting plan in Wisconsin, and Benisek v. Lamone, which addresses
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claims of partisan gerrymandering regarding a congressional redistricting plan in
Maryland. In addition to the substantive questions presented in these cases, the Court
is considering whether partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable—an issue that
could have important implications for future litigation. The Court turns to the subject
of racial gerrymandering in Abbot v. Perez, 17-586 (2017). Supporting Texas, seven
states filed a joint amicus brief urging the Court to note probable jurisdiction and
reverse the lower court’s decision invalidating certain state congressional districts,
warning that the district court decision could “throw[] elections into disarray” and
have “widespread implications for States entering the 2018 election cycle and the
coming 2020 redistricting cycle, destabilizing the democratic system in all States” (Brief
for Louisiana et al. as Amici Curiae 2017, 1). Aside from these docketed cases, the
Court also entered a partial stay of a lower court’s decision invalidating districts in
North Carolina. However, the Court declined to stay a Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision invalidating the state’s congressional map under the Pennsylvania
Constitution as the product of partisan gerrymandering.
Another case on the Court’s current docket worth watching for its federalism
implications is South Dakota v. Wayfair, 17-494 (2017). In Quill v. North Dakota,
504 U.S. 298 (1992), the Court reaffirmed a long-standing precedent that a state
violates the dormant Commerce Clause when requiring out-of-state companies
with no instate physical presence to pay taxes on sales to state residents. At issue in
Wayfair is whether the physical-presence rule, which emanates from cases
concerning the mail-order industry, should be jettisoned in an era where e-
commerce plays an integral role in the marketplace. In support of South Dakota’s
effort to overturn Quill, forty-one states filed a joint amicus brief arguing that the
status quo leaves them “in an increasingly untenable position,” depriving states of
“billions of dollars in tax revenue each year, requiring cuts to critical government
programs” (Brief for Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae 2018, 1).
Conclusion
The key themes that characterized the state of American federalism in 2017–2018
included federal policy reversal, executive action, and state resistance. As we
observed in last year’s annual review, “unified government is not necessarily a
panacea for increased legislative production” (Goelzhauser and Rose 2017, 308).
With the Republican-controlled Congress largely sidelined by partisan infighting,
the Trump administration stepped into the vacuum, with wide-ranging
consequences for both the Obama administration’s legacy and intergovernmental
relations. In the absence of federal legislation on health care reform, immigration
reform, and a host of other pressing issues, federal policy change emanated
primarily from the White House. In a sense, these developments reflect the
continuation of Obama-era trends; however, what is striking in the current
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political environment is that executive action continues to be so prominent in the
context of unified party control of government.
State resistance to the Trump administration’s agenda also took place largely
outside the legislative arena. Taking a cue from the Republican attorneys general
who had challenged the ACA, EPA rules, and other Obama-era policies in court,
Democratic attorneys general stepped into the fray in 2017–2018 with scores of
legal actions against the Trump administration, many of which were still making
their way through the courts at the time of writing. “Once a staid backwater
mostly seen as a political stepping stone,” the office of the state AG has emerged as
a major bulwark, playing “among the most pivotal roles slowing and stopping the
march of the Trump agenda” (Neuhauser 2017). The prominent role of
Democratic state attorneys general in fighting administration policies is, in part, a
function of the Democratic Party’s limited control of state legislatures and
governorships—something that could change following the 2018 election.
Notes
The authors are listed in reverse alphabetical order but contributed equally to the article.
The authors thank John Dinan and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier
drafts. S.R. thanks Ellen Lempres for research assistance and the Rose Institute of State and
Local Government for support.
1. Colorado, Washington, Alaska, Oregon, California, Nevada, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Washington, DC, legalized recreational use of marijuana through ballot initiatives.
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